We develop and calibrate a model where di¤erences in factor endowments lead countries to trade di¤erent goods, so that the existence of international trade changes the sectorial composition of output from one country to another. Gains from trade re ‡ect in total factor productivity. We perform a development decomposition, to assess the impact of trade -and barriers to trade-on measured TFP. In our sample, the median size of that e¤ect is about 6.5% of output, with a median of 17% and a maximum of 89%. Also, the model predicts that changes in the terms of trade cause a change of productivity, and that e¤ect has an average elasticity of 0.71.
Introduction
A large literature (e.g., Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) , Prescott (1998) , Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) , Caselli (2005) among many) has studied the cross-country di¤erences in total factor productivity, that is, those di¤erences in output per-capita that cannot be explained by corresponding di¤erences in available inputs. In these exercises, it is assumed that the technology that transforms inputs into output is the same across countries, except for a single TFP coe¢ cient that changes the e¤ectiveness of the overall production process, but does not change the way di¤erent inputs interact with each other. The functional forms used in these analyses are chosen assuming that countries do not trade with each other, and are calibrated using parameters that give a good …t to the data of developed nations.
In this paper, we quantify the impact of international trade on Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Trade leads to a more e¢ cient allocation of resources across sectors, and thus may a¤ect aggregate productivity even if sectorial productivities are not allowed to di¤er across countries. Since barriers to trade do vary signi…cantly, the degree to which gains from trade are exploited may be a relevant component in explaining cross-country TFP di¤erences.
Here, we use a one-period version of the model developed in Ferreira and Trejos (2006) , with the adjustments made necessary by the cross-country data analysis that follows. The equilibrium of that model under autarky is homeomorphic to the standard model used in most development accounting exercises, so comparison is convenient. The simplest way of formulating this model is to interpret the traded goods as inputs in the production function of a …nal non-tradeable good, but it is not the fact that these are intermediate goods that matters, but rather that there is a sectorial allocation problem that trade barriers may distort. By construction, this model predicts that trade will be of little importance for rich countries, but for a poor country the model predicts that trade induces a sizeable gain in TFP, which increases with trade liberalization and with the terms of trade 1 .
We calibrate this model and apply it to a large sample of developing countries, to assess the quantitative importance of the e¤ects mentioned above.
Because countries reap at least some of these bene…ts from trade, the TFP di¤erences between rich and poor countries that are estimated with our model are larger than those emerging from more conventional output decompositions, which are performed assuming a closed economy. For the country in our database with the lowest capital endowment per worker, Uganda, our calibrated model estimates that free trade could increase output by 89:8% compared to autarky; in other words, the raw productivity di¤erence relative to the US is much larger than conventional measurements (which would impute those gains from trade as productivity) would deliver. The assessed gains from trade for other African nations (Congo, Mozambique and Rwanda, among others) range between 50% and 62% of productivity; for several Asian countries, around 15%. Of course, many countries waste a good part of these gains through protectionism. We estimate that in 1985 Bangladesh and India, who should have enjoyed gains from trade to the tune of 1=3 of GDP due to their capital scarcity, wasted most or all those gains with average tari¤s at prohibitive levels over 90%.
Because countries can pick very di¤erent trade policies, the model adds another dimension that can explain the behavior of TFP residuals. We do not have comparable cross-country data for transportation costs, non-tari¤ barriers, and other phenomena that reduce the incentives to international exchange. But looking at data on tari¤s we …nd that for some poor nations, those barriers alone are large enough to account for large di¤erences in provery di¤erent questions with it. In the …rst case, the objetive is to characterize the dynamic properties of this model, showing that under trade there may be multiple steady states, and the model is calibrated for the purpose of comparing quantitatively the income level at the lower steady state (that is, the development trap) with the one at the higher steady state. It is mentioned in the paper that in the model trade amounts to a productivity gain, and the implications are quanti…ed within the model, but this productivity gain is not taken to data, nor analyzed more fully. In this second paper, we ignore the dynamic issues, and take the problem to the cross country data, to assess the potential and actual e¤ects of trade on output, and how the estimates of productivity residuals are a¤ected by taking into account the extent to which di¤erent countries tap on the gains from trade.
ductivity. Due to the nature of the trade problem, the same tari¤s would have a di¤erent cost in di¤erent countries, because both the potential gains from trade and the distortionary e¤ect of policy vary with the capital-labor ratio. gain in the terms of trade yields a 5:7% gain in TFP, and these e¤ects can be larger depending on factor endowments and trade policies 2 .
In Section 2 we describe and solve the model, and in Section 3 we describe the data and calibration. In Section 4, we present the results and Section 5
concludes.
The model
We model the world as a collection of small economies that trade with a much larger and wealthier country. The asymmetry in sizes is such that -for all practical purposes-the autarkic domestic prices in the big country are the international prices, and the small countries are price takers. The picture in our mind is that the big economy is the US (or perhaps the US plus the EU).
We focus our attention on the equilibrium allocation in the other countries.
There are three goods in these economy: two non-storable, tradable intermediate products, A and B, and a …nal good, Y , which presumably can be consumed or invested (but we do not look at consumption or investment decisions here), and that cannot be traded. Each good is produced, by a large number of small, competitive …rms, using technologies that have constant returns to scale.
There are also two factors of production in this economy: labor in e¢ cient 2 Other possible explanations are …nancial market frictions (Mendoza, 2006) , labor hoarding and changes in capital utilization (Meza and Quintin, 2007) and costs in shifting resources across sectors ( Kehoe and Ruhl, 2006) . units L and physical capital K. Labor and capital are used in producing A and B, and these in turn are used to produce Y . The endowment of labor, measured in e¢ ciency units, is given by:
where N is the number of workers, h represents e¢ ciency-units of labor per worker and s stands for schooling. The production functions of A and B are:
Without loss of generality, A is labor-intensive: a < b . We use B as numeraire, and the relative prices of A and Y in terms of B are denoted p and .
Because A and B are tradable, the amounts of them that are used in the production of the …nal good (denoted a and b) may di¤er from the amounts produced (denoted A and B). Total output of Y is given by:
All markets are perfectly competitive; in the case of A and B, these are not domestic but rather global markets, from which local Y producers can import provided they pay an ad-valorem tari¤ . The rate captures all the (policy or non-policy induced) costs of bringing goods into the local market.
We denote k = K=L in general, and in particular de…ne k as the capitallabor ratio of the large, developed country where international A and B prices are set, which we shall calibrate to be the US. We restrict our analysis to small countries where k < k .
To solve for an equilibrium, derive the allocation of capital K and labor L among the A and B industries, the quantities a and b used domestically, and the amount of …nal output Y . 3 We seek for a set of prices for all factors and goods, so that all …rms maximize pro…ts,
entry (that is, all …rms have zero pro…ts) and no international lending (that is,
. The relevant part of the solution, for our present purposes, can just be summarized as an equilibrium mapping
that relates …nal output with factor endowments. The mapping F is not a production function, in the sense that it does not describe an exogenouslyimposed technological relationship. It describes an equilibrium relationship that takes into account the technologies and markets for all the products, and the equilibrium e¤ects of trade in the optimal choice for …nal good producers.
Notice then that plays the role of Total Factor Productivity, but also that changes in or p, by a¤ecting F without changing inputs, can also a¤ect measured TFP. In the Appendix, we show that one can derive functions s, x, and i such that the equilibrium mapping F can be written as
where
Interpreting (2), if the economy has a very low capital-labor ratio, it will only produce the labor-intensive good A, export some of it, and import all the b that it uses to make …nal goods from the capital-richer country. In that case, the mapping F is just proportional to the value of A production, and thus takes the shape of a Cobb-Douglas with the lower capital share a . For higher k the economy diversi…es -although the country is still an exporter of A and importer of B-and as a consequence of the Factor Price Equalization Theorem, F is linear in K and L for an interval. 6 Even higher k implies that 5 We derive the function F (K; Hj ; p) only for values of k < k because this is the relevant interval for the groups of countries we study. The derivation for values of k > k is straightforward. 6 When the factor endowment is inside the diversi…cation cone, the capital intensity for each industry in the price-taking market becomes a constant, pinned down by international prices. Then, alternative values of K=L just change the mix across industries, but not within industries; factor prices are then set and production of Y is linear in K and L; a the factor endowment is too close to that of the larger trading partner, so that the bene…ts from trade are not enough to compensate for the trading cost , and thus the economy is in autarky. In that case, F is a Cobb-Douglas, with a capital share equal to the weighted average . One can show that for the large economy that is a price setter rather than a price taker, the equilibrium
It is straightforward to show that 1 , 2 and 3 are decreasing in ; in other words, increases in the cost of trade decrease output. The reason is that induces a distortion on the relative price of A in terms of B, that makes the imported good more expensive domestically. Because we restrict our analysis to countries that are more labor abundant than the economy where prices are set (that is, k < k ), the imported good is the capital intensive good B, and thus this distortion ine¢ ciently shifts to the B industry resources that could be used more e¢ ciently producing A, while also inducing the Y industry to use a higher a=b mixture as inputs. Furthermore, s and x are also decreasing in and, in the limit, x ! 0 as ! 1: In other words, under a high enough tari¤ there is no trade.
Similarly, 1 , 2 and 3 are increasing in p, the relative price of the labor intensive good A in which our labor-abundant small countries have comparative advantage. Hence, when terms of trade improve, output of …nal goods increases, a relationship that is further explored and interpreted below.
Data and calibration
We use the Penn-World Tables (PWT) analysis to the countries where the estimated k ratio is less than the US level. We …nd this calibration to be conservative, in the sense that it predicts that the entire potential gains from trade -that is, from autarky to free tradefor a country with Mexico´s GDP are 1:1% (about half the number estimated by Kehoe and Kehoe (1995) as the static gains from exploiting comparative 7 Ideally we would have liked to use cross-country data that re ‡ected the total cost of international trade, whether induced by policy, distance, logistics or other factors. Clearly, the World Bank tables are a lower bound, both because they include only tari¤s, and because these are calculated as unweighted averages, which include very low tari¤s reported for some non-tradeables.
As extensively documented in the survey by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , non-tari¤ barriers and transportation costs can be quite expensive according to several estimates. However, we have not identi…ed any database with an uniform measurement or estimation of these other costs for a large sample of countries. 8 As in Cooley and Prescott (1995) , the service ‡ow of total capital in our economy includes those of public capital and durables, which is re ‡ected in the calibrated value of the capital share :
advantage that Mexico would reap from joining NAFTA). As we shall see, even though under this calibration the gains from trade are modest for a middleincome country with comparatively high k like Mexico, it can also be very high for the world's poorest countries.
PWT data and data-model mapping
In taking the model to the data, we have to be careful about which measure of GDP we utilize, both in the PWT data and in the model itself. From basic national income accounting, we know that one can estimate GDP at local prices both from the value added across products (GDP O L ) and from the local absorption of goods and services (GDP
and
It does not matter if one measures output or expenditure, both numbers have to be the same, as it is the income emerging from the output what purchases the expenditure, at domestic prices.
But it is obvious, since we are trying to capture di¤erences in productivity across countries, that we need PPP data, because we do not want our results distorted by the fact that a given currency's value varies from place to place, since the exchange rates are not identical to the purchasing power di¤erences.
The problem then becomes that the estimations of GDP O P P P and GDP E P P P do not yield the same number, since it is no longer the case that the value of local output is exactly su¢ cient to purchase local expenditure, if both are measured at somewhere else's prices.
In particular, as Feenstra et.al (2007) indicate, if one wants to measure GDP O P P P , one would correct the sum of sectorial outputs or, equivalently, correct each element of GDP E L by its own price de ‡ator, re ‡ecting the di¤erence in cost across countries of each component. Therefore, one would measure
where p i is a component speci…c price de ‡ator. As Feenstra et.al indicate, making a PPP correction this way yields an output measure that does not include the whole gains from trade. That is because the e¤ect of trade on output through the reallocation of inputs across sectors is re ‡ected, but the improvement of the set of allocations that can be a¤orded is not. In the language of basic trade theory, this measure of GDP would include the production e¢ -ciencies but not the consumption e¢ ciencies a¤orded by trade. Alternatively, one can use a measure of GDP E P P P that takes the value of expenditures and corrects it for purchasing power di¤erences (using a domestic absorption price index P D ), or
so that the trade balance is valued according to the absorption that it a¤ords.
As the previous sources again indicate, this measure does include all the gains from trade, including the consumption e¢ ciencies.
As described in Summers and Heston (1991), the PWT gets GDP as a measure of real national income -GDP E from aggregate demand in the benchmark years (and interpolate using national accounts data). In other words, conveniently for us, their data uses the PPP correction to GDP that includes the whole gains from trade. It is also convenient that 1985 is a benchmark year, as we will use data from this year in the simulations.
We also need to decide which measure of national income from the model is matched more naturally with PWT's PPP GDP data. Should we use Y , or pA + B, as the object we bring to the numbers? We believe that the best choice is to use Y , rather than pA + B, for the very same reason that separates 
Results

Gains from trade
Trade increases output given the level of inputs, and ignoring this e¤ect biases the measurement of total factor productivity. De…ne the size of the gains from trade by
Then, for a country with productivity i , if one uses the closed-economy production function F (K; Lj = 1) = 4 KL 1 to perform the development decomposition, the resulting estimation of TFP will be b i = i , which will be biased upwards relative to i . The e¤ect of ignoring the gains from trade would be larger for countries that are very poor or very open, as is decreasing in both and k. In fact, for a country with low enough capital that under trade it would specialize in the production of the labor intensive good A (that is, if k < s( ; p)), there is a constant such that
which is increasing in p and , and can become arbitrarily large as k ! 0.
9
The following …gure illustrates the size of as a function of k=k under our calibration, for values of = 0 and = 0:28, where this last value is the average tari¤ in our sample of 71 developing countries. Notice that around k = 0:01k we observe 0 2, so ignoring the gains for trade leads to an estimate of TFP that is twice as high. Notice also that under = 0 the gains from trade fall smoothly with k, and still boost GDP over 10% for a relatively rich country with half the US capital-labor ratio. Meanwhile, under = 0:28 gains from trade suddenly fall abruptly for k > s(p ; 0:28) 0:2 (as the economy ceases 9 The bigger the di¤erence between the factor endowments between trading partners, the larger the gains from trade. Since by construction we have assumed that the large economy who sets international prices is capital-rich compared to its trading partners, the lower k is in these, the more they gain from trade. Of course, it does not take very high barriers to trade to make much of these gains to go away. For the same countries (again, …nd the rest in the Appendix), we list in the next table the levels of that make the gains from trade to be a third of 0 , half of 0 , or disappear altogether. In contrast, in countries such as Brazil and South Africa, in which k is relatively high, the tari¤ necessary to shut them from trade is very small. In fact, in both cases the observed tari¤ in 1985 is well above this level, so that they lost all the potential gains from trade.
Labor-abundant countries would specialize in producing only the laborintensive good with low k < s(p; ). The country would acquire all the B it needs from the international market at a much lower opportunity cost, and hence the large gain from trade. In a less capital-poor country, where s(p; ) < k < x(p; ); …rms still …nd it pro…table to produce more A than needed by the local market, yet some B gets produced domestically as well. In this case, the potential gains are smaller as the countries endowment is not that di¤erent from the one of its trading partner (that is, k and k are close). Finally, a rich enough country, where k > x(p; ), will simply not trade. In that case, is bigger than the di¤erence between the international prices and the local prices that prevail without trade.
The next …gure shows the functions s(p; )=k and x(p; )=k as they vary with the tari¤ rate , for our calibration. One can verify that under free-trade, countries with less than 54% of the US levels for k would be fully specialized in 
Productivity decomposition
We proceed now to make the decomposition. The usual approach yields
If an economy is in autarky, then = 1 = 1, and thus b = : However, if tari¤s are low enough, then > 1, and thus one may overestimate the true TFP; ; if one ignores the impact of international trade.
Dividing by the number of workers, L, we get output per worker, or
We use this expression in a otherwise standard level decomposition exercise, in which income di¤erence with respect to the US is measured as
The two …rst components in the right hand side are standard in level de- Is there a way in which one can say that our estimated is a better number than the usual b ? In particular, is there any puzzling aspect of b as it is conventionally measured, that gets explained once we divide the trade and non-trade components of productivity? When we consider (by running a simple OLS regression, for instance) the relationship between income per capita and standard closed-model TFP, b ; we …nd high positive correlation, as expected, but a large number of outliers countries for which TFP is either much higher or smaller than expected for its income level. Some examples would be Sierra Leone, Jordan, Uganda and Mozambique and Guatemala. However, for the case of the trade-corrected measure of TFP, ; this phenomena is less pronounced and the relationship between y and is much smoother. Hence, a large part of the relationship between y and b was due to international exchange, and once we correct for the gains from trade, estimated TFP falls.
The R-squared of the regression of on y (both relative to the U.S.) is higher 10 Note that in the case of b our results are not too distant from the literature. We redid our decomposition in a manner similar to Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and RodriguezClare (1997) BK5 decompositions and found, for instance, that in 1985 TFP of Uganda, Senegal and Niger was, respectively, 61%, 49% and 35% of the U.S. These numbers are very close to ours (58%, 48% and 29%).
and, more importantly, the sum of squared residual is 43% smaller than that of the regression of b on y, and indication of a better …t. Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) show that there is a strong link between the terms of trade and total factor productivity in the data of some countries (like the US and Mexico), and cite a number of other papers that have also pointed out this empirical fact.
TFP e¤ects of changes in terms of trade
11 They also illustrate through a variety of macro models that the standard approach cannot account for this relationship, which is a puzzle in need of an explanation. We believe that the model described in the previous sections provides one plausible mechanism to understand this puzzle:
improvements in the terms of trade change the allocation of resources across sectors, inducing higher specialization in a way that increases productivity. To be precise, an increase in p induces a reallocation from K B to K A and from L B to L A , and simultaneously raises b at the expense of a, in a manner that is conducive to higher income and output. It is straightforward to see that as long as k < k then @Y @p 0, as 1 , 2 and 3 in (2) are increasing in p.
Furthermore, as Kehoe and Ruhl also argue, this …nding depends on how is output measured. Notice in particular that while in the model the sign of the e¤ect of terms of trade on real income is unambiguous, this is not necessarily the case if, for example, output is measured using a Laspeyres method and no PPP correction (as many countries do), especially when tari¤s are high.
Measuring qA + B, using q = p=(1 + ), would be the equivalent to applying
Laspeyres. After an increase in p, old prices (used in Laspeyres) put a premium on B over A, compared to new prices; similarly, domestic prices (which include the tari¤) put a premium on the imported good over the exported good. The real gains from trade may not be enough to compensate both biases. On the other hand, if one uses PPP corrected rather than domestic prices, these biases do not exist, and the positive link between terms of trade and productivity is then unambiguous.
12
How big is the e¤ect of changes in p on measured productivity? It depends on the level of income and the size of barriers to trade. In particular, recall from (4) that when the economy is poor enough to be specialized in the production of the labor intensive good -that is, when k < s(p ; )-then is proportional to p advantage, so productivity grows. Further increases in terms of trade allow the economy to produce increasingly more e¢ cient sectorial mix, both on the 12 Something similar happens when one considers the e¤ects of trade liberalization. Rodriguez-Clare, Trejos and Sáenz (2005) describe how measured TFP in Costa Rica, performed using the local NPIA, calculated with a Laspeyres method and a base year before the opening of the economy, is biased downwards. The reason is that the price vector puts a premium precisely on imported goods (as they contain the old tari¤s), while the liberalization shifts resources in the other direction, to the production of exportables. What is an increase in TFP after trade liberalization using PPP GDP, looks like a fall of measured TFP when using domestic statistics. 
Conclusion
In this paper we presented evidence that gains from trade are relevant to measured productivity. We used a very simple version of the Hecksher-Ohlin Moreover, the methodology we use does not capture the fact that barriers to trade do a¤ect investment decisions and so capital stocks, something we have shown in a previous paper (Ferreira and Trejos (2006) ). In this sense, the current exercise is also limited as it takes stocks as given but does not consider that, if it were not for trade restrictions, they would be considerably larger.
Of course, the fact that poor countries with high tari¤s are still enjoying 
A Appendix
We present in details the derivation of the production function used in the paper. The pro…t maximization problems in the de…nition of stationary equilibrium yield:
Similarly, the market clearing conditions for K and L can be transformed into:
where =L A =L and the production functions are then written as
In the case of an economy that do not trade the condition pa + b = pA + B is substituted instead for the conditions a = A; b = B. In that case, the above solves into
where = a + (1 ) b: Then, more algebra yields the solutions:
These imply that total output Y (under a = A; b = B) is:
From 5 and the expression of q one can derive:
where x is the minimal capital level for the economy not to trade (i.e, x( ; p)
in (2)). Likewise, following similar steps one can derive:
where s 1 corresponds to s( ; p) in (2) In the case that the economy is diversi…ed and export A and import B, the solution of the factor allocation problem is:
From the expression above and (7) the equilibrium expression of Y in this case is:
where:
Finally, when the economy is fully specialized in A (so that k < s 1 ), one can derive (after imposing K B = L B = B = 0) from (5), (8) and the expression for the equilibrium in the market for intermediate goods:
where: 
